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SUBJECT: U.S. SUBMISSION FOR NATO AFRICA EXPERTS MEETING

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED BY INR FOR USE BY THE U S.  
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE NATO AFRICAN EXPERTS MEETING TO BE  
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HELD OCTOBER 28-29. NATO CAPITALS MAY SHARE WITH MEETING  
PARTICIPANTS. IF KNOWN.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

I. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA  
(ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, RWANDA, LIBERIA AND SUDAN. SOMALIA  
WILL BE SUBMITTED LATER)

II. SOUTH AFRICA: PROGRESS TOWARD NONRACIAL ELECTIONS

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III. DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA (ZAIRE, ZAMBIA, CENTRAL  
AFRICAN REPUBLIC, NIGER, GHANA, TOGO, NIGERIA)

I. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA  
(ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, RWANDA, LIBERIA, SUDAN)

--ANGOLA

4. NEITHER THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT NOR UNITA SHOW ANY DESIRE AT THIS TIME TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. IN ITS RESPONSE TO UNITA'S RECENT PEACE PROPOSALS, THE GOVERNMENT INDICATED IT WANTS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SMOOTH THE WAY TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

5. IN ITS OCTOBER 6 COMMUNIQUE UNITA SAID IT ACCEPTED THE BICESSE ACCORDS, BUT INDICATED THEY HAD TO BE "BROUGHT UP TO DATE". UNITA ALSO ACCEPTED THE SEPTEMBER 1992 ELECTION RESULTS, THOUGH THEY WERE "FRAUDULENT",  
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AND THE ABIDJAN AGREEMENT AS A "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS". UNITA SAID IT WOULD EXTEND ITS UNILATERAL "CEASEFIRE IN PLACE" AND ASKED FOR UN OBSERVERS TO MONITOR IT.

6. THE GOVERNMENT STUDIED THE OCTOBER 6 UNITA "PEACE PROPOSALS" UNTIL OCTOBER 9 BEFORE SUGGESTING A PRELIMINARY MEETING BETWEEN THE UN ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM-II), THE TROIKA OF OBSERVERS, AND UNITA TO "CLARIFY THE AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS" CONTAINED IN THE UNITA COMMUNIQUE. IN AN OCTOBER 11 SPEECH, ANGOLAN PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS DEMANDED UNITA'S "UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTIONS" AND THEIR RESULTS.

7. THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS NOT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED UNITA'S CEASEFIRE, REPEATED ITS DEMAND THAT UNITA WITHDRAW FROM AREAS IT HAS SEIZED SINCE OCTOBER 1992. UNITA OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD THEIR TROOPS TO STAND FIRM AND NOT CONCEDE TERRITORY TO THE GOVERNMENT.

8. GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUE TO RECEIVE SOUTH KOREAN NORTH KOREAN AND EAST EUROPEAN ARMS BY AIR AND SEA WHILE UNITA, IN SPITE OF UN SANCTIONS. OBTAINS ARMS VIA

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ZAIRE. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT MEDIA CLAIMS THAT UNITA IS ON THE ATTACK AND OFFICIALS DENY THAT THERE IS A TRUE CEASEFIRE, INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS REPORT THAT THE OVERALL MILITARY SITUATION HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL SKIRMISHES AS BOTH SIDES PROBE EACH OTHER'S DEFENSES. FRESH UNITA TROOPS ARE CONCENTRATING, HOWEVER, AROUND CENTRAL ANGOLAN PROVINCIAL CAPITALS

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KUITO AND MENONGUE OR MOVING INTO STAGING AREAS FOR POTENTIAL FORAYS AGAINST NEW TARGETS. THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A NEW COMPULSORY MILITARY DRAFT PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF OCTOBER AND IS RESUPPLYING AND FORTIFYING TROOPS ALONG THE FRONT LINES.

9. THE PROSPECT OF SERIOUS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR TERM IS LIMITED. UNITA NO LONGER PERCEIVES THE TROIKA COUNTRIES WHICH MEDIATED THE BICESSE ACCORDS AS NEUTRAL SINCE THEY WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN THE UN'S DECISION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS, AND PORTUGAL AND RUSSIA ARE PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE SANCTIONS PUNISH UNITA BUT ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO REARM OPENLY. THE GOVERNMENT, WITH MORAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, IS UNDER NO IMMEDIATE PRESSURE TO NEGOTIATE. (BERNTSEN)

--MOZAMBIQUE

10. A YEAR AFTER PEACE ACCORDS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND RENAMO WERE SIGNED IN ROME, THE CEASE-FIRE IN MOZAMBIQUE IS HOLDING AND A SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY IS RETURNING AFTER 16 YEARS OF CIVIL WAR. ECONOMIC RECOVERY IS STARTING TO TAKE HOLD, INTERNALLY DISLOCATED MOZAMBICANS ARE RETURNING TO THEIR HOME AREAS, AND REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ARE STARTING TO REPATRIATE. RAINS HAVE RETURNED AND RELIEF SUPPLIES ARE REACHING THE VICTIMS OF LAST YEAR'S DROUGHT.

11. DESPITE A SERIES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT CHISSANO AND RENAMO LEADER DHAKAMA IN MAPUTO IN LATE

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AUGUST AND EARLY SEPTEMBER, THEY ARE STILL DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON RESOLVING ISSUES FUNDAMENTAL TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORDS:

-- UNOMOZ IS NOW IN A POSITION TO READY TO MONITOR DEMOBILIZATION, BUT DHLAKAMA SAYS HE IS HOLDING UP THE START OF ASSEMBLY OF HIS FORCES UNTIL ALL IRREGULAR FORCES, SUCH AS GOVERNMENT-FORMED PRIVATE MILITIAS, ARE DISBANDED.

-- FRELIMO, RENAMO, AND THE 12 MINOR OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON THE GROUND RULES FOR THE MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS OR ON THE FORMULA FOR APPORTIONING SEATS ON THE COMMISSION THAT WILL MONITOR THE ELECTIONS.

-- RENAMO HAS NOT LIVED UP TO ITS PROMISE TO PLACE ITS CONTROLLED AREAS UNDER GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN RETURN FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF THREE RENAMO-NOMINATED ADVISORS FOR EACH OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS TO INSURE THAT RENAMO-AREAS GET THEIR FAIR SHARE OF GOVERNMENT RESOURCES.

-- CHISSANO HAS REJECTED DHLAKAMA'S DEMAND THAT RENAMO REPRESENTATIVES BE APPOINTED TO IMPORTANT POSITIONS IN THE MEDIA. CHISSANO, HOWEVER, HAS AGREED TO THE UN MONITORING OF POLICE ACTIVITIES TO ADDRESS RENAMO'S FEARS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL USE THE POLICE TO GUARANTEE CONTINUED FRELIMO CONTROL ONCE DEMOBILIZATION BEGINS.

12. DESPITE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, DHLAKAMA IS DELAYING DEMOBILIZATION IN ORDER TO PRESSURE THE FOREIGN AID DONORS TO GUARANTEE FUNDS BOTH TO INSURE RENAMO'S FUTURE AS A POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND TO INSURE HIS ROLE AS A "BIG CONFIDENTIAL

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CHIEF" WHO CAN REWARD HIS FOLLOWERS.

13. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET. ALTHOUGH CHISSANO DOES NOT WANT TO RETURN TO FIGHTING AND COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT LOSING THE ELECTION, OTHERS AROUND HIM MAY NOT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT SUCH A LOSS, WHICH WOULD END THEIR ACCESS TO POWER. CHISSANO ALSO HAS TO COPE WITH A TOP MILITARY LEADERSHIP RIDDLED BY CORRUPTION AND FEARFUL FOR ITS CAREER AND FINANCIAL PROSPECTS ONCE A NEW UNIFIED ARMY IS FORMED. SOME OF THEM MAY EVEN BE TEMPTED TO PROVOKE RENAMO BACK INTO COMBAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITIONS AND THE PEROGATIVES OF POWER. (SIEGEL)

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--RWANDA

14. AN AUGUST 4 PEACE SETTLEMENT ENDED 34 MONTHS OF HOSTILITIES WHICH INCLUDED SOMETIMES INTENSE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE REGIME AND REBELS OF THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF). DURING THAT PERIOD AN ESTIMATED 10,000 PERSONS WERE KILLED AND ONE MILLION PEOPLE ONE-EIGHTH OF THE POPULATION WERE DISPLACED. PROSPECTS FOR FULLY IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT AND FORMING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THE RPF WERE ENHANCED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S OCTOBER 5 ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN "ASSISTANCE MISSION" TO MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE, DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF THE RIVAL FORCES, AND REFUGEE REPATRIATION.

15. THE CONFLICT MOVED TOWARD RESOLUTION WHEN KEY LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES BECAME CONVINCED THAT VICTORY WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPOSSIBLE. THE GOVERNMENT ARMY WAS OUTFOUGHT ON THE BATTLEFIELD BY THE RPF AND MAY HAVE COLLAPSED IF NOT FOR THE AID OF A SMALL FRENCH CONTINGENT IN THE CAPITAL. THE RPF, COMPOSED MAINLY OF THE 14 PERCENT MINORITY TUTSI ETHNIC GROUP THAT DOMINATED THE SOCIETY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, COULD NOT WIN A TOTAL VICTORY BECAUSE OF ITS VULNERABILITY TO REPRISALS BY THE HUTU MAJORITY. THE STALEMATE FORCED A YEAR OF TALKS THAT FOSTERED GOOD WORKING RELATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES AND LED TO DETAILED AGREEMENTS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT, MILITARY INTEGRATION, AND REPATRIATION OF TUTSI REFUGEES.

16. BOTH SIDES SEE THE UN AS AN HONEST BROKER THAT CAN OVERCOME INTER-ETHNIC SUSPICIONS AND HELP IMPLEMENT THE SETTLEMENT. RPF LEADERS, ENCAMPED IN THE NORTH AND FEARING FOR THEIR SAFETY, REFUSE TO GO TO THE CAPITAL TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE EXPECTED UN FORCE ARRIVES. THE UN EXPECTS TO DEPLOY AN INITIAL 800 TROOPS TO KIGALI AND ITS FORCE COULD EXPAND UP TO 2500 MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BEFORE BEING WITHDRAWN AFTER NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN LATE 1995.

17. THE RPF WILL TAKE 40 PERCENT OF THE PLACES IN THE INTEGRATED 13,000-STRONG ARMY AND HALF THE OFFICER SLOTS DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL. THE AUGUST AGREEMENT MAINTAINS HABYARIMANA AS A PRESIDENT WITH SUBSTANTIALLY

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REDUCED POWERS AND LIMITS HIS PARTY TO ONLY FIVE SEATS IN A 21-MEMBER EXECUTIVE CABINET THAT WILL RUN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT UNTIL ELECTIONS. THE GREATEST THREAT TO PEACE PROBABLY COMES FROM THOSE, INCLUDING CLOSE HABYARIMANA ASSOCIATES AND RELATIVES, WHO ENJOYED  
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POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN THE ONE-PARTY STATE. SO FAR.  
RWANDAN HUTUS AND TUTSIS APPEAR COMMITTED TO RESOLVING  
THESE PROBLEMS--AND KEEPING INTER-ETHNIC PEACE.  
(EHRENREICH)

--LIBERIA

18. DELAYS IN DISARMING THE WARRING LIBERIAN FACTIONS AND MOVING FROM THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (IGNU) TO THE NEWLY FORMED LIBERIAN NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (LNTG) HEIGHTEN THE CHANCES THAT THE LABORIOUSLY CRAFTED PEACE ACCORD WILL UNRAVEL.

19. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JULY 1993 PEACE ACCORD REQUIRES THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS THROUGHOUT LIBERIA AND THE ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS FROM SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES--POSSIBLY UGANDA, TANZANIA, AND ZIMBABWE. IT WILL TAKE AT LEAST THREE MONTHS TO PREPARE AND EQUIP THESE TROOPS FOR DEPLOYMENT INTO TERRITORY HELD BY THE NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA (NPFL), AND MUCH LONGER TO ESTABLISH A NEW NATIONAL ARMY. IN THE INTERIM, MISTRUST AND HOSTILITY AMONG THE FACTIONS AND THE PROSPECT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF NIGERIAN TROOPS IN 1994--AS ANNOUNCED BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT IN SEPTEMBER--COULD LEAD TO RENEWED VIOLENCE, PRECLUDING DEMOBILIZATION AND CONDEMNING LIBERIA TO PROTRACTED FIGHTING AND DE FACTO PARTITION.

20. IGNU PRESIDENT SAWYER'S REFUSAL TO TURN POWER OVER TO THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS PROMPTED A BOYCOTT OF LNTG MEETINGS BY THE NPFL. SAWYER'S STANCE NOT ONLY  
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DELAYS THE TRANSITION BUT ALSO PROVIDES AMMUNITION TO THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH TO DISARM.

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21. SINCE THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE LNTG WERE SELECTED LAST MONTH, SOME PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE TRANSITION HAS BEEN DONE, BUT NO DATE FOR THE LNTG TO ASSUME OFFICE HAS BEEN SET. INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE MILITARY ACTION BY THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA (AFL) AGAINST THE NPFL ADDS A SERIOUS COMPLICATION TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE ARRIVAL OF UN MONITORS, EXPECTED SHORTLY, SHOULD ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. FOR THE SHORT TERM, NIGERIA APPEARS COMMITTED TO STAYING THE COURSE. BUT PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTING THE LIBERIAN PEACE AGREEMENT IS LIKELY TO BE A KEY FACTOR IN THE LENGTH OF ITS STAY. IF NIGERIA DOES WITHDRAW BEFORE DISARMAMENT, ENCAMPMENT, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT IN MONROVIA, THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR PROBABLY WILL RESUME.  
(ROBERTS)

--SUDAN

22. ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS TO RESOLVE THE SUDANESE CIVIL WAR ARE COMPLICATED BY A MULTITUDE OF PROSPECTIVE MEDIATORS, BY KHARTOUM'S MIXED SIGNALS, DIVISIONS WITHIN THE SOUTHERN REBEL MOVEMENT AND THE INTRANSIGENCE OF REBEL LEADERS. SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE NEAR TERM IS UNLIKELY.

23. TOO MANY COOKS. SINCE THE FAILURE OF NIGERIAN-SPONSORED TALKS BETWEEN KHARTOUM AND GARANG'S FACTION OF THE SPLA IN MAY, NEW MEDIATORS HAVE COME TO CONFIDENTIAL

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THE FORE. IN EARLY SEPTEMBER THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DROUGHT AND DEVELOPMENT (IGADD), REPRESENTING SUDAN AND ITS HORN OF AFRICA NEIGHBORS. NAMED KENYAN PRESIDENT MOI TO UNDERTAKE A PEACE INITIATIVE. ON SEPTEMBER 21 KHARTOUM ACCEPTED FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER'S PREVIOUSLY REJECTED OFFER TO MEDIATE. MEANWHILE, TWO INTERNAL SUDANESE MEDIATION EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY. THOUGH THESE EFFORTS DO NOT NECESSARILY CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IS HAMPERED BY A LACK OF COORDINATION.

24. SPLA MANEUVERS. THE INITIAL FOCUS FOR BOTH THE CARTER AND THE MOI/IGADD EFFORTS IS TO BRING ABOUT A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN GARANG'S MAINSTREAM SPLA FACTION AND THE "SPLA-UNITED" (SPLA-U) FACTION THAT BROKE WITH

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GARANG TWO YEARS AGO. SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BETWEEN THE REBELS AND THE GOVERNMENT COULD THEN FOLLOW. SPLA-U MILITARY CHIEF RIAK MACHER NOW APPEARS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH GARANG AFTER HAVING FAILED TO TOPPLE HIM--DESPITE HIS TACTICAL ALLIANCE WITH KHARTOUM. HE MADE A RARE TRIP TO NAIROBI LAST WEEK TO MEET WITH GARANG UNDER MOI'S AUSPICES. MOREOVER, POLITICAL DIVISIONS BETWEEN GARANG AND THE SPLA-U APPEAR TO BE NARROWING. GARANG, WHO ONCE INSISTED ON A UNITARY STATE, WILL NOW ACCEPT A CONFEDERATION, WITH INDEPENDENCE TO BE DECIDED IN TWO YEARS BY REFERENDUM. THIS MIGHT BE RECONCILED WITH THE SPLA-U'S CALL FOR SOUTHERN "SELF-DETERMINATION."

25. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE AUTHORITARIAN GARANG INSISTS THAT HE ALONE MUST CONTROL THE SFLA. RIAK AND  
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COMPANY CAN ONLY REJOIN IN A CLEARLY SUBORDINATE ROLE.  
GARANG HAS REMAINED IN SUDAN, OSTENSIBLY FOR MILITARY  
REASONS, AND REFUSES TO ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS.  
EVENTUALLY, RIAK MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN REJOINING GARANG OR  
DRAWING CLOSER TO KHARTOUM.

26. KHARTOUM'S GAME. SO LONG AS MOST ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON THE INTERNAL SPLA NEGOTIATIONS, THE ISLAMIST REGIME IN KHARTOUM CAN PROFESS ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE PEACE EVEN AS ITS TROOPS LAUNCH ANOTHER "FINAL" OFFENSIVE. ITS SIMULTANEOUS ENCOURAGEMENT OF VARIOUS MEDIATORS INCLUDING THE INTERNAL SUDANESE, MOI/IGADD AND CARTER APPEARS DESIGNED TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE AND BUY TIME. KHARTOUM EVENTUALLY WANTS TO WIN OR SETTLE THE WAR IN THE SOUTH AS IT IS COSTLY, UNPOPULAR WITHIN THE ARMY, AND DRAWS INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. THUS, ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION HAS BECOME A BIT MORE FLEXIBLE. IT NOW CLAIMS TO SUPPORT A FEDERAL STATE IN WHICH SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE COULD BE DECIDED IN A REFERENDUM AFTER 10 YEARS--LONG ENOUGH TO DIVIDE, PLACATE OR COOPT ENOUGH SOUTHERNERS TO MAKE ITS RULE SECURE. DESPITE ITS PROFESSED WILLINGNESS TO TALK, KHARTOUM SEEKS FOREMOST TO STRENGTHEN ITS POLITICAL POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE SPLA BY IMPROVING ITS MILITARY POSITION. (EHRENREICH)

II. SOUTH AFRICA: PROGRESS TOWARD NONRACIAL ELECTIONS

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27. ON SEPTEMBER 23, A MAJOR HURDLE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS CLEARED WHEN PARLIAMENT PASSED A  
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BILL THAT SETS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (TEC). THE BILL GIVES THE TEC, A MULTIPARTY BODY, THE POWER TO INTERVENE WHENEVER THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OTHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATION TAKES ACTIONS THAT MIGHT INTERFERE WITH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE ON APRIL 27, 1994. PARLIAMENT ALSO PASSED THREE OTHER BILLS THAT WILL SET UP AN INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION, AN INDEPENDENT MEDIA COMMISSION, AND AN INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY, ALL OF WHICH WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE TEC TO OVERSEE THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THE FOUR BILLS MUST FIRST BE RATIFIED BY A PLENARY MEETING OF THE MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATING FORUM, AND A DRAFT CONSTITUTION MUST BE FINALIZED BY NEGOTIATORS AND PASSED BY PARLIAMENT, BEFORE THE FOUR BODIES THE BILLS PROPOSE CAN BE IMPLEMENTED.

28. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEC, WHICH COULD OCCUR BY DECEMBER, IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THE PRE-ELECTION PROCESS. ITS EXISTENCE WILL RESULT IN THE GOVERNMENT SHARING POWER WITH BLACKS FOR THE FIRST TIME. EACH OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH IS, OR AT ANY TIME WAS, A MEMBER OF THE MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATING FORUM IS ENTITLED TO ONE MEMBER ON THE TEC, PROVIDED THAT ORGANIZATION COMMITS ITSELF IN WRITING TO "PROMOTING A CLIMATE FOR FREE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION," TO "PROMOTING CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS," AND "RENOUNCES VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES." THE TEC IS ALSO EMPOWERED, AT ITS DISCRETION, TO ADMIT TO  
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MEMBERSHIP OTHER ORGANIZATIONS WHICH SATISFY THE ABOVE CONDITIONS.

29. THE TEC AND ITS SEVEN SUBCOUNCILS--REGIONAL AND

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES; LAW AND ORDER; DEFENSE; FINANCE; FOREIGN AFFAIRS; THE STATUS OF WOMEN; AND INTELLIGENCE--WILL ALSO HAVE THE POWER, AT LEAST IN THEORY, TO OVERRULE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS THAT THEY BELIEVE COULD PREJUDICE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THE SUBCOUNCILS, WHICH WILL HAVE BETWEEN SIX AND EIGHT MEMBERS, WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO BY TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY VOTES, EXCEPT FOR THOSE DEALING WITH LAW AND ORDER. DEFENSE, AND INTELLIGENCE, WHERE AN 80 PERCENT VOTE WILL BE REQUIRED. IF THE GOVERNMENT CHALLENGED MAJORITY VOTE DECISIONS IN THE SUBCOUNCILS, THE DISPUTE WOULD BE APPEALED TO THE FULL TEC COUNCIL, WHERE A 75 PERCENT MAJORITY VOTE WOULD BE NEEDED TO OVERRULE THE GOVERNMENT.

30. THE HIGH PERCENTAGE MAJORITIES NECESSARY FOR THE TEC'S INTERVENTION, AT EITHER SUBCOUNCIL OR FULL COUNCIL LEVELS, IN GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING--PARTICULARLY IN THOSE DEALING WITH LAW AND ORDER, DEFENSE, AND INTELLIGENCE--WILL MAKE IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. IN PRACTICE, FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) AND ITS ALLIES ON THE ONE HAND TO OVERRULE THE NATIONAL PARTY (NP) AND ITS ALLIES ON THE OTHER. NONETHELESS, THE ANC IS APPARENTLY SATISFIED THAT THE POWERS ALLOTTED TO THE TEC ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE BOTH PLAYER AND REFEREE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS.

31. TRYING TO SATISFY BUTHELEZI. DESPITE THIS POSITIVE  
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MOMENTUM IN THE NEGOTIATING FORUM, THE ABSENCE SINCE JULY 2 OF INKATHA CHIEF BUTHELEZI AND HIS CONSERVATIVE ALLIES FROM THE MULTIPARTY TALKS CONTINUES TO CAST A PALL OVER THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. WITHOUT HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS, NEGOTIATORS RISK BUTHELEZI'S UNLEASHING EVEN MORE VIOLENCE DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THE THREAT OF INCREASED VIOLENCE WILL BE FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY THE CONTINUED ALLIANCE BETWEEN BUTHELEZI AND WHITE CONSERVATIVES. BUTHELEZI HAS THUS FAR RESISTED ATTEMPTS BY THE NP AND THE ANC TO DRAW HIM BACK INTO THE MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

32. BUTHELEZI'S INTRANSIGENCE IS ROOTED IN HIS CONVICTION THAT THE NP AND THE ANC SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, HAVE ENGAGED IN SECRET BILATERAL DEALMAKING AND, MORE SIGNIFICANTLY. IN HIS DEEP-SEATED FEAR THAT AN ANC-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT WILL

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STRIP HIM OF HIS POWER IN KWAZULU AND IN NATAL PROVINCE. AS A RESULT, HE HAS BEEN INSISTING THAT THE EXISTING NEGOTIATING FORUM--IN WHICH INKATHA WOULD BE EQUALLY REPRESENTED (IF IT RETURNED) WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC--SHOULD DRAFT A FINAL CONSTITUTION. AS THE MATTER NOW STANDS, AN ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT AND ANC WOULD HAVE FAR GREATER REPRESENTATION THAN INKATHA, IS TO DRAFT THE FINAL CONSTITUTION.

33. THE ANC AND NP RECOGNIZE THAT HOLDING ELECTIONS WITHOUT BUTHELEZI'S COOPERATION WOULD INVITE HIGHER LEVELS OF VIOLENCE. AS A RESULT, NP AND ANC NEGOTIATORS HAVE GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO MEET BUTHELEZI'S DEMANDS.

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RESPONDING TO HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE BOUNDARIES AND POWERS OF REGIONS BE ENTRENCHED IN THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION, NEGOTIATORS AGREED IN LATE AUGUST THAT THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA NOT ONLY SHOULD CONSIST OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM, BUT ITS REGIONS SHOULD HAVE SEPARATE CONSTITUTIONS AND POWERS. IN THE CASE OF KWAZULU/NATAL, THIS COULD MEAN THAT BUTHELEZI WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO RAISE A STANDING ARMY. WHICH GOES FAR BEYOND THE RIGHTS OF STATES IN MOST OTHER FEDERAL SYSTEMS.

34. BUTHELEZI'S REJECTION OF THESE CONCESSIONS HAS LEFT GOVERNMENT AND ANC LEADERS FRUSTRATED AND CONFUSED BY WHAT SEEMS TO BE HIS CONSTANTLY CHANGING GAME PLAN. NONETHELESS, NP AND ANC NEGOTIATORS APPEAR CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL FIND A WAY TO SATISFY BUTHELEZI'S DEMANDS. THEY ARE NOW DISCUSSING WITH INKATHA OFFICIALS A REFORMULATION OF THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION, WHICH REPORTEDLY WOULD INCLUDE GUARANTEES THAT THEY COULD NOT BE REVISED LATER BY AN ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. THEY HAVE ALSO REPORTEDLY GIVEN INKATHA ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL REMOVE THE DEADLOCK-BREAKING MECHANISM NOW INCORPORATED IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION, WHICH INKATHA REJECTED ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT COULD HAVE EMPOWERED THE ANC TO DEMAND THE REDRAFTING OF THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION. NOT ONLY MIGHT THESE STEPS GIVE BUTHELEZI SUFFICIENT ASSURANCES THAT HIS POWER BASE WILL REMAIN SECURE, BUT GUARANTEED PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM WOULD GO FAR TOWARD SATISFYING SOME OF THE DEMANDS OF WHITE CONSERVATIVES--AND SOME WHITE EXTREMISTS--FOR A SYSTEM

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OF GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD PROTECT MINORITY RIGHTS.

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35. THE THREAT FROM THE RIGHT. ONE OF THE POTENTIALLY STRONGEST THREATS TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS COMES FROM WHITE CONSERVATIVES AND EXTREMISTS, WHO ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REVERSE OR INFLUENCE MOVEMENT TOWARD BLACK MAJORITY RULE. THEIR FEAR AND ANGER, AS MAJORITY BLACK RULE LOOMS, ARE DRAINING SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND HELPING TO WELD TOGETHER A RIGHTWING FRONT--THE AFRIKANER PEOPLE'S FRONT (AVF)--LED BY THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY (CP) AND SUPPORTED BY THE EXTREMIST AFRIKANER RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND SEVERAL SMALLER GROUPS.

36. SOME 119 WHITE EXTREMIST GROUPS ARE KNOWN TO EXIST. THE LARGEST OF WHICH IS THE AWB. THEIR MEMBERS ARE HEAVILY ARMED, HAVE ACCESS TO SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS AND PROBABLY HAVE SOME ALLIES IN THE SECURITY FORCES, INCLUDING THE SENIOR RANKS. EVEN IN SMALL NUMBERS, THEY ARE CAPABLE OF SIGNIFICANT DISRUPTIONS. THE GOLDSTONE COMMISSION HAS GATHERED CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT WHITE EXTREMISTS HAVE ON MANY OCCASIONS INSTIGATED VIOLENCE IN THE BLACK TOWNSHIPS AND THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WHITE EXTREMISTS PLOTTED THE APRIL ASSASSINATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER CHRIS HANI.

37. BOTH THE NP AND THE ANC ARE TAKING VERY SERIOUSLY THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF THE DEMAND OF WHITE CONSERVATIVES AND EXTREMISTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT AFRIKANER HOMELAND IS NOT MET, THE AVF COULD CAUSE ENOUGH DISRUPTIONS TO DELAY THE SCHEDULED APRIL 1994 NONRACIAL ELECTIONS AND THE THREAT OF A RIGHTWING ARMED

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UPRISING WOULD INCREASE. AS A RESULT. IN A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN POLICY, THE ANC ENGAGED THE AVF IN SECRET TALKS IN SEPTEMBER AND NOW, AS NELSON MANDELA REVEALED TO THE PRESS ON OCTOBER 4. IS REVIEWING A MAP THAT INCLUDES A REGION WHERE AFRIKANERS WOULD HAVE LIMITED AUTONOMY. EVEN IF THE TWO SIDES REACH AN AGREEMENT HOWEVER THE

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MODERATE ANC LEADERSHIP WILL FACE STRONG RESISTANCE TO ANY ACCOMMODATION OF RIGHTWING DEMANDS FROM ANC MILITANTS AND THEIR YOUNG SUPPORTERS. WITHIN THE AVF, WHICH REPRESENTS A DISPARATE COLLECTION OF ORGANIZATIONS, STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE FLAN NOW BEING CONSIDERED WILL COME FROM THOSE WHO REFUSE TO COMPROMISE ON THEIR DEMAND FOR A COMPLETELY AUTONOMOUS AFRIKANER HOMELAND.

38. NEXT STEPS. NUMEROUS OTHER HURDLES REMAIN, ANY ONE OF WHICH COULD DELAY THE APRIL 1994 ELECTION DATE. MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATORS MUST STILL FINALIZE THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD--THE FIRST TWO DRAFTS PRESENTED IN JULY AND AUGUST HAVE BEEN WIDELY VIEWED AS DISORGANIZED AND MISSING SUCH FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AS JUSTICE AND LIBERTY. A DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS IS EQUALY UNPOLISHED. APPEARING TO SKIRT THE ISSUE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, AN ESPECIALLY CRITICAL ONE FOR ALL RACES. NEGOTIATORS HAVE ALSO FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON DELIMITATION/DEMARCACTION OF REGIONS FOR BOTH THE ELECTIONS AND FOR REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. FURTHERMORE THE CRITICAL TASKS OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND VOTER EDUCATION, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE MAJORITY BLACK POPULATION, HAVE BARELY BEGUN.

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39. VIOLENCE REMAINS THE MOST DANGEROUS THREAT TO THE NEGOTIATING AND ELECTION PROCESSES. THE CHANCE THAT IT WILL INTENSIFY TO THE POINT OF PREVENTING ELECTIONS INCREASES THE LONGER BUTHELEZI AND HIS WHITE CONSERVATIVE ALLIES STAY OUT OF THE PROCESS AND THE LONGER IT TAKES TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. NONETHELESS, IF THE NP AND THE ANC CAN OFFER BUTHELEZI ENOUGH TO GET HIM BACK INTO THE TRANSITION PROCESS, AND IF THE TEC IS IMPLEMENTED BY DECEMBER, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE VIOLENCE WILL, AT THE VERY LEAST, NOT EXCEED ITS PRESENT LEVELS AND THAT THE MULTIPARTY FORUM WILL COMPLETE THE OTHER TASKS IN TIME TO MEET THE APRIL 1994 ELECTION DEADLINE. (INFORMATION CURRENT AS OF OCTOBER 8.)

III. DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA (ZAIRE, ZAMBIA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, NIGER, GHANA, TOGO, NIGERIA)

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40. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES HAVE GENERATED CONTESTED MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS IN 23 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN NATIONS SINCE JANUARY 1990. ELECTIONS ARE SCHEDULED LATER THIS YEAR IN FOUR ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES AND THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL ELECTIONS IN 1994. SOME OF THESE ELECTIONS HAVE NOT, UNFORTUNATELY, ADVANCED THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS.

41. IN SOME COUNTRIES, HEADS OF STATE HAVE FRUSTRATED DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS AS IN NIGERIA, WHERE FORMER MILITARY LEADER BABANGIDA ANNULLED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA WHERE DESPOT OBIANG IS CONFIDENTIAL

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INCREASINGLY REMINISCENT OF HIS LATE UNCLE, AS WELL AS IN CAMEROON, ZAIRE AND TOGO. IN EACH CASE AN UNPOPULAR HEAD OF STATE HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO SUBMIT HIMSELF TO FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS THUS CONTRIBUTING TO HEIGHTENED TENSIONS AND VIOLENCE. IN OTHER CASES--ANGOLA AND CONGO--THE REFUSAL OF LOSERS TO ACCEPT ELECTION RESULTS HAS ALSO PRODUCED RENEWED VIOLENCE.

42. MORE POLITICAL FREEDOM. EVEN IN MANY OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE DEMOCRACY HAS YET TO BE REALIZED, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE AREA OF POLITICAL FREEDOM. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HAS GENERALLY IMPROVED ACROSS THE CONTINENT; INDEPENDENT AND OPPOSITION NEWSPAPERS ARE FLOURISHING. THERE HAS BEEN A NOTICEABLE GROWTH IN CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE EXPANSION OF BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL AND RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS. SUCCESS IN ONE COUNTRY SOMETIMES HAS HAD A MULTIPLIER AFFECT, ENCOURAGING CITIZENS IN A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY TO PRESS FOR SIMILAR PROGRESS.

43. ECONOMIC REFORMS DIFFICULT. DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC REFORM ARE PROVING DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERTAKE SIMULTANEOUSLY. AS IN NIGER AND BURUNDI, EXPECTATIONS OF IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS GENERATED BY THE MOVE TO DEMOCRATIC RULE USUALLY FAR EXCEED THE ABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS TO RESPOND. GROUPS EXPECTING QUICK ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT ARE LIKELY TO RESIST THE AUSTERITY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS. IN MANY COUNTRIES NEWLY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ARE FINDING THE TREASURY EMPTY, FORCING THEM TO SEEK FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AT A TIME OF DONOR REDUCTIONS.

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44. SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC REFORM, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO HAVE IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION. IN SOME CASE. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS HAVE REDUCED THE ABILITY OF THE STATE TO MONOPOLIZE POWER. THEY HAVE LIMITED GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND LICENSING AND FAVERED INFORMAL ECONOMIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

45. DEMOCRACY AND ETHNICITY. WHILE SOME HEADS OF STATE, SUCH AS KENYA'S PRESIDENT MOI, HAVE SAID THAT MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY WILL DEEPEN ETHNIC TENSIONS, THE OBVERSE APPEARS TO BE THE CASE, AS IN TOGO, CAMEROON AND EQUATORIAL GUINEA, WHERE DOMINATION OF THE STATE BY ONE GROUP HAS DRAMATICALLY HEIGHTENED ETHNIC DIVISIONS. ETHNIC ANIMOSITIES HAVE INCREASED IN KENYA, BUT MOI HAS EXACERBATED THEM TO MAINTAIN HIS HOLD ON POWER. A MORE OPEN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN RWANDA, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS A KEY CATALYST IN REACHING A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN RIVAL ETHNIC GROUPS.

46. FEWER MILITARY GOVERNMENTS. WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, MOST NOTIBLY IN NIGERIA, THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS HAS DIMINISHED. SOME LEADERS, SUCH AS RAWLINGS IN GHANA, HAVE TRADED THEIR UNIFORMS FOR THE MUFTI OF ELECTED PRESIDENTS. THE COUP RATE HAS DECLINED SINCE 1985 AS DEMOCRATIZATION HAS EMPOWERED CITIZENS TO REMOVE UNPOPULAR LEADERS BY MORE PEACEFUL MEANS AND AS MILITARY REGIMES HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY DISCREDITED. NEVERTHELESS, GENERALIZATIONS CAN ONLY BE TAKEN SO FAR AND EACH COUNTRY IS A PRODUCT OF ITS OWN UNIQUE

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POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL HISTORY. (MANN)

--ZAIRE

47. OVER THREE YEARS OF POLITICAL WRANGLING HAVE BARELY BEGUN TO MOVE ZAIRE TOWARD DEMOCRATIC RULE, WHILE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION HAS EXACTED A HEAVY TOLL IN HUMAN SUFFERING THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE

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COUNTRY. REVERSING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVASTATION  
WILL TAKE YEARS. PERHAPS DECADES.

48. POLITICAL STALEMATE. ON SEPTEMBER 30, AFTER THREE WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS, MOBUTU'S REPRESENTATIVES AND OPPOSITION DELEGATES ANNOUNCED THEY HAD AGREED TO MERGE THEIR RIVAL INTERIM LEGISLATURES AND CONSTITUTIONS, AND TO HOLD A POPULAR REFERENDUM ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION. THEY REMAINED DEADLOCKED OVER THE QUESTION OF REPLACING RIVAL INTERIM PRIME MINISTERS TSHISEKEDI AND BIRINDWA. TSHISEKEDI HAS REFUSED REQUESTS, EVEN BY HIS OWN SUPPORTERS, THAT HE STEP DOWN AND ALLOW A COMPROMISE PRIME MINISTER TO TAKE OVER. HIS INTRANSIGENCE IS FUELING TENSIONS AMONG OPPOSITION RANKS AND COULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN OPPOSITION SPLIT IF THE STALEMATE CONTINUES.

49. "ETHNIC CLEANSING." ETHNIC UNREST IN THE ONCE-LUCRATIVE MINING REGION OF SHABA HAS DISPLACED MORE THAN 250,000 PEOPLE WHOSE FOREBEARS COME FROM THE NEIGHBORING REGIONS OF KASAI OCCIDENTAL AND KASAI ORIENTAL. THOUSANDS ARE IN TRANSIT CAMPS, WHERE DISMAL HEALTH AND SANITATION CONDITIONS ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THE

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RISING DEATH TOLL. IN THE ONCE-THRIVING FARM BELT OF NORTH KIVU, MORE THAN 6,000 PERSONS OF RWANDAN DESCENT HAVE BEEN KILLED AND OVER 200,000 DISPLACED. ZAIRIAN SOLDIERS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN SOME OF THE ATTACKS, AND LOCAL OFFICIALS HAVE EXACERBATED LONGSTANDING TENSIONS WITH INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC.

50. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS. DEATHS FROM HUNGER AND DISEASE ARE INCREASING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, BUT SOCIAL SERVICES ARE BEING CURTAILED. RELIEF WORKERS IN KINSHASA SAY THEY CAN NOT MEET THE GROWING DEMAND FOR FOOD. MEDICAL SERVICES ARE DETERIORATING, WHILE REPORTS OF MALARIA, CHOLERA, AND OTHER CONTAGIOUS DISEASES. INCLUDING AIDS, ARE INCREASING.

51. REFUGEE UPHEAVAL. CROSS-BORDER REFUGEE FLOWS IN AND OUT OF ZAIRE ARE FUELING TENSIONS IN ZAIRE'S BORDER REGIONS AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. IN HAUT-ZAIRE. SUDANESE FLEEING CIVIL WAR ARE SEEKING REFUGE IN TEMPORARY ENCAMPMENTS AND LOCAL VILLAGES. IN SOUTHERN ZAIRE, ANGOLAN REFUGEES ENCOUNTER HUNGER AND

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UNEMPLOYMENT, OFTEN EXACERBATED BY THE ANTI-KASAIAN PERSECUTION IN SHABA. ZAIRIANS FLEEING TO OTHER COUNTRIES--ZAMBIA, UGANDA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, AND CONGO--HAVE HEIGHTENED ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CONCERNS IN THOSE COUNTRIES.

52. ECONOMIC CRISIS. ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION HAS REACHED DRAMATIC PROPORTIONS. ESTIMATES OF INFLATION EXCEEDED 4,000 PERCENT IN 1992. ZAIRE WAS SUSPENDED BY THE WORLD BANK FOR NON-PAYMENT OF ARREARS  
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IN JULY 1993. AS OF MID-AUGUST, ZAIRE'S EXTERNAL US DOLS 10 BILLION DEBT WAS AT LEAST 250 PERCENT OF ESTIMATED 1993 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY KINSHASA. EXPECTED 1993 GOVERNMENT REVENUES. ABOUT US DOLS 180 MILLION, ARE ONLY ONE-TWENTIETH ZAIRE'S TOTAL ARREARS ON EXTERNAL DEBT.

53. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED MINING COMPLEX, GECAMINES, WHICH PRODUCED OVER 80 PERCENT OF ZAIRE'S EXPORTS IN THE 1980S, HAS ALMOST GROUNDED TO A HALT AND COULD CEASE OPERATIONS IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. IN THE PORT CITY OF MATADI, FACILITIES ARE HANDLING ONLY ABOUT ONE-HALF OF THEIR PRE-1990 LEVELS. ELSEWHERE IN ZAIRE. MANY PEOPLE ARE OPTING OUT OF THE FORMAL ECONOMY ENTIRELY, RETURNING TO SUBSISTENCE FARMING, FORAGING, AND HUNTING IN ORDER TO SURVIVE.

54. MILITARY UNREST. MEETING THE MILITARY PAYROLL--THE KEY TO MOBUTU'S POLITICAL LONGEVITY--IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE IN THE CURRENT INFLATIONARY CLIMATE. ZAIRIAN TROOPS, ALWAYS AGGRESSIVE IN USING EXTORTION TO AUGMENT THEIR REGULAR PAY, HAVE BECOME EVEN MORE UNDISCIPLINED. MILITARY RIOTS OVER PAY ISSUES HAVE ERUPTED IN BANDUNDU HAUT-ZAIRE, NORTH KIVU, SOUTH KIVU, AND IN MOBUTU'S HOME REGION OF EQUATEUR. EVEN HIS TRUSTED SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL DIVISION (DSP) IS JOINING IN THE LOOTING AND VIOLENCE.

55. EDUCATIONAL UPHEAVAL. THE GOVERNMENT RISKS THE SPECTER OF A "LOST GENERATION" OF YOUTH WITH ITS CONTINUED NEGLECT OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM. MUCH OF THE  
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1992-93 SCHOOL YEAR WAS LOST AS A RESULT OF ECONOMIC SHORTAGES AND STRIKES BY TEACHERS AND STUDENTS. IN MANY AREAS, SCHOOL BUILDINGS, LEFT EMPTY FOR MONTHS, HAVE BEEN LOOTED AND VANDALIZED, AND WILL REQUIRE EXTENSIVE REPAIRS BEFORE THEY CAN REOPEN.

56. GRIM FUTURE. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN ZAIRE HAS NOT YET REACHED THE LEVELS OF SOME OTHER AFRICAN STATES--ANGOLA AND SOMALIA, FOR EXAMPLE--BUT THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ILLS CONTINUE TO WORSEN AS THE POLITICAL DEBATE DRAGS ON. MOREOVER, ANY FUTURE REGIME WILL REQUIRE MASSIVE INFUSIONS OF EXTERNAL AID TO REVERSE THE DECLINE.

--ZAMBIA

57. PRESIDENT CHILUBA HAS NOT FOUND THE GOING EASY IN RECENT MONTHS. IN APRIL HE DECLARED A "STATE OF EMERGENCY" AFTER SOME PROMINENT FOLLOWERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT KAUNDA WERE ACCUSED OF TRYING TO CREATE DISSENSION IN ORDER TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT; THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ENDED IN LATE MAY. PARTY CRITICS CHARGED THAT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS UNNECESSARY AND THEY SUGGESTED THAT CHILUBA WAS NOT ABOVE ABUSING PRESIDENTIAL POWER. RUMORS ABOUND THAT HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING; CHILUBA'S INABILITY OR REFUSAL TO TAKE CREDIBLE STEPS ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS IS LOSING HIM SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. AS WELL AS AMONG FOREIGN DONORS.

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58. IN ITS EFFORTS TO CARRY OUT THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM WORKED OUT WITH THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK, THE GOVERNMENT HAS HAD TO LAY OFF THOUSANDS OF PUBLIC AND PARASTATAL WORKERS AS WELL AS MAINTAIN WAGE LEVELS WHICH DO NOT KEEP UP WITH INFLATION. CHILUBA'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE STRONG LEADERSHIP ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES ENCOURAGED A GROUP OF PROMINENT MP POLITICIANS WITH STRONG LOCAL/ETHNIC BASES TO RESIGN FROM THE MOVEMENT FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY (MMD) PARTY IN MID-AUGUST AND FORM AN OPPOSITION NATIONAL PARTY. THE

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MMD ALSO EXPelled A HANDFUL OF PARLIAMENTARY SYMPATHIZERS AND DECLARED THE SEATS OF ALL DISSENTERS VACANT. THE GOVERNMENT REGISTERED THE NEW PARTY PROMPTLY AND HAS SET A MID-NOVEMBER DATE FOR BY-ELECTIONS FOR THE VACANT PARLIAMENTARY SEATS.  
(BERNTSEN)

--CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

59. FELIX-ANGE PATASSE WON THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC'S FIRST MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1960 WITH JUST OVER 52 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF ON SEPTEMBER 19. HE AND HIS OPPONENT, ABEL GOUMBA--WHO WON 47 PERCENT OF THE SECOND-ROUND VOTE--HAD ALREADY ELIMINATED PRESIDENT KOLINGBA, FORMER PRESIDENT DACKO, AND FIVE OTHER OPPOSITION CANDIDATES IN FIRST-ROUND ELECTIONS IN AUGUST. PATASSE IN HIS SEPTEMBER 27 VICTORY SPEECH URGED HIS SUPPORTERS IN THE MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN PEOPLE (MLPC) TO AVOID WITCH HUNTS OR EFFORTS TO SETTLE OLD SCORES, AND TO WORK

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TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

60. KOLINGBA'S PARTING SHOT. KOLINGBA HAD TRIED TO OVERTURN THE OUTCOME OF THE FIRST ROUND OF VOTING WHEN HE REALIZED HE WAS TRAILING THREE OF HIS OPPONENTS. HE ISSUED A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ALTERING SEVERAL ELECTION REGULATIONS AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT, BUT QUICKLY BACKED DOWN UNDER A FRENCH THREAT TO SEVER ALL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY TIES. WHEN THE VOTES WERE COUNTED, KOLINGBA HAD WON ONLY ABOUT 12 PERCENT OF THE FIRST-ROUND VOTE. HIS PARTING SHOT WAS TO ORDER THE RELEASE FROM PRISON OF FORMER PRESIDENT BOKASSA, WHO WAS SERVING A 20-YEAR TERM FOR EMBEZZLEMENT AND MURDER, AND HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF CANNIBALISM AND INFANTICIDE DURING HIS 13-YEAR REIGN THAT ENDED IN 1979. ON HIS RELEASE, BOKASSA COMPARED HIS IMPRISONMENT TO THE SUFFERING OF JESUS CHRIST AND SAID HE MIGHT CONSIDER STAGING A POLITICAL COMEBACK, BUT HE HAS LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT AND IS UNLIKELY TO REENTER PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AS A SERIOUS CANDIDATE.

61. GOUMBA'S DEFEAT. GOUMBA'S CONCESSION SPEECH ON SEPTEMBER 27 WAS SURPRISINGLY CONCILIATORY: HE

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CONGRATULATED HIS OPPONENT AND SAID HE HAD WORKED TO MAKE THE ELECTIONS A CONTEST OF PRINCIPLES RATHER THAN REGIONAL OR ETHNIC SOLIDARITY. GOUMBA HAD CAMPAIGNED PRIMARILY ON A PLATFORM CRITICIZING KOLINGBA'S FAILURE TO REVIVE THE ECONOMY; IN MOST AREAS, VOTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ALONG ETHNIC LINES. A FEW DAYS LATER GOUMBA ABANDONED ANY PRETENSE OF GRACE IN DEFEAT, ALLEGING HE AND HIS CONCERTED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (CFD) HAD BEEN

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DEFRAUDED OF THEIR RIGHTFUL VICTORY. HE ALSO SAID THE CFD WOULD EXPEL ANY PARTY MEMBER WHO ACCEPTED A CABINET POSITION OFFERED BY PATASSE. GOUMBA'S INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC THREATENED TO PROVOKE ANGRY RESPONSES FROM BOTH SIDES, AND COULD BACKFIRE BY ALLOWING KOLINGBA TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE.

62. COALITION POLITICS. IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. ALSO COMPLETED ON SEPTEMBER 19, PATASSE'S MLPC WON 33 OF THE 85 SEATS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. KOLINGBA'S RALLY OF CENTRAFRICAN DEMOCRATS (RCD) WON ONLY 14. THE CAR'S FIRST WOMAN TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT, RUTH ROLLAND, WAS THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE FROM THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PARTY. THE REMAINING 37 SEATS--OVER A THIRD OF THE ASSEMBLY--WILL BE DIVIDED AMONG INDEFENDENTS AND 10 OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES. PATASSE'S OPPONENTS WILL THUS BE FORCED TO FORGE BROAD COALITIONS TO AVOID DOMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT, WHILE PATASSE AND HIS MLPC SUPPORTERS MAY HAVE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO FORMER POLITICAL OPPONENTS TO AVOID CLASHING WITH AN OPPOSITION-DOMINATED ASSEMBLY. (BYRNES)

--NIGER

63. MAHAMANE OUSMANE. PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL CONVENTION (CDS-RAHAMA) PARTY, ON MARCH 27 WON NIGER'S FIRST MULTIPARTY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SINCE INDEPENDENCE FROM FRANCE IN 1960. PRESIDENT OUSMANE WON 54.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTE AFTER A COALITION OF EIGHT OTHER PARTIES RALLIED BEHIND HIM TO PREVENT THE FORMER RULING PARTY CANDIDATE, TANDJA MAMADOU, FROM WINNING.

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INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS HAVE FLOURISHED SINCE THE 17-MONTH TRANSITION FROM ONE-PARTY DOMINATION AND MILITARY RULE. THE NASCENT DEMOCRACY, HOWEVER, STILL FACES A PLETHORA OF CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR REVIVING THE COUNTRY'S BANKRUPT ECONOMY, REDUCING LABOR/STUDENT UNREST. AND MAINTAINING A TRUCE WITH THE TUAREGS.

64. DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. LEGISLATIVE AND TWO ROUNDS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1993 AFTER SIX ELECTORAL POSTPONEMENTS SINCE THE 1991 NATIONAL CONFERENCE. A DECEMBER 26, 1992 REFERENDUM PAVED THE WAY FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS WHEN NIGERIENS VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY IN SUPPORT OF A NEW CONSTITUTION. NIGER'S ARMED FORCES (FAN), ONE OF THE SMALLEST PER CAPITA MILITARIES IN THE WORLD, ASSISTED THE ELECTORAL PROCESS BY MAINTAINING ITS NEUTRALITY. THE TRANSITIONAL PRINCIPALS, PRESIDENT SAIBOU, PRIME MINISTER CHEIFFOU, AND HIGH COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC PRESIDENT SALIFOU, WERE BARRED BY THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE FROM RUNNING FOR ELECTION. THE CENTRIST PLATFORMS OF THE CDS SET A POSITIVE TONE FOR THE CAMPAIGN. OUSMANE PROMOTED HUMAN RIGHTS AND A MIXED ECONOMY.

65. OVER THE PAST SEVEN MONTHS. NIGER HAS CREATED NEW INSTITUTIONS, LEADING TO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, INCLUDING THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF COMMUNICATIONS TO ENSURE AN INDEPENDENT PRESS. LEGISLATIVE TENSIONS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY THE SUPREME COURT. CONSULTED REGULARLY BY OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES SEEKING DEMOCRACY, OUSMANE HAS STATED THAT THE KEY TO MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK IN

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NIGER WAS "ORGANIZING OURSELVES" AMONG "GRANDES PRINCIPLES," AND FINDING "COMMON LINES WITH THE OPPOSITION." HE HAS ALSO SAID THAT DEMOCRACY IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT IS DIFFICULT DUE TO LACK OF TOLERANCE. DIALOGUE, AND UNDERSTANDING.

66. CHALLENGES AHEAD. NOTWITHSTANDING THE SMOOTH TRANSITION. OUSMANE FACES NUMEROUS OBSTACLES. HE INHERITED A VIRTUALLY BANKRUPT TREASURY AND A MORIBUND ECONOMY. RECURRING DROUGHT AND A PLUNGE IN THE PRICE OF URANIUM, NIGER'S SINGLE IMPORTANT EXPORT, HAVE COMPOUNDED THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC CRISIS. UNDER

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PRESSURE FROM THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND BILATERAL DONORS, THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED AN AUSTERITY BUDGET ON AUGUST 13, 1993 WHICH CONTAINED CUTS, RANGING FROM 10 TO 30 PERCENT, IN CIVIL SERVICE SALARIES AND OPERATING COSTS.

67. ECONOMIC REFORMS HAVE ANGERED STUDENTS, LABOR UNIONS, AND THE MILITARY. STUDENTS, WHO PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRATIZATION, BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT OWES THEM SOMETHING. DEMANDING PAYMENT OF ALLOWANCES, MILITANT STUDENTS TRASHED FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES HEADQUARTERS LAST MAY AND CONDUCTED A SIT-IN AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE IN JULY. LABOR HAS STRUCK REPEATEDLY AND A GROUP OF RADICAL, ENLISTED MILITARY PERSONNEL MUTINIED BRIEFLY IN JULY TO PROTEST REFORMS AND SALARY ARREARS.

68. THE JUNE 10 TRUCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE TUAREG REBELS WAS EXTENDED ON SEPTEMBER 10 FOR AN  
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ADDITIONAL 3 MONTHS. FACTIONALISM AMONG THE VARIOUS TUAREG GROUPS, CONTINUED BANDITRY, AND EXTREMELY LIMITED RESOURCES PRESENT FUTURE TESTS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

69. WITH SUCCESS ACHIEVED IN THE POLITICAL AREA, NIGER WILL CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON PUTTING ITS ECONOMIC HOUSE IN ORDER. ALTHOUGH CONTINUED STRIKES AND MILITARY DISCONTENT ARE LIKELY, REVERSION TO MILITARY RULE IS UNLIKELY. (O'NEILL)

--GHANA

70. GHANA MOVED CLOSER TOWARD MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY ON NOVEMBER 3, 1992 WHEN THE COUNTRY SUCCESSFULLY HELD ITS FIRST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 13 YEARS. PROVISIONAL NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL CHAIRMAN (PNDC) AND LONGTIME GHANAIAN LEADER JERRY RAWLINGS RECEIVED 58 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. AN INDEPENDENT COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS JUDGED THAT RAWLINGS DID IN FACT WIN THE ELECTIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY NOTED SOME IRREGULARITIES. DESPITE HIS DISTRUST OF UNRESTRAINED DEMOCRACY, RAWLINGS SUBMITTED HIMSELF TO THE ELECTORAL TEST. ALTHOUGH HE EXPLOITED HIS INCUMBENCY, HIS VICTORY WAS PRIMARILY A REFLECTION OF THE ESTEEM IN WHICH HE IS HELD BY ORDINARY GHANAIANS. ON DECEMBER 29, 1992,

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LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WERE HELD. THE ELECTIONS WERE BOYCOTTED BY THE OPPOSITION, HOWEVER, WHICH ACCUSED RAWLINGS OF FRAUD.

71. GHANA IS CURRENTLY A MODIFIED ONE-PARTY STATE.

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ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE OPPOSITION IS BECOMING MORE ORGANIZED AND MAY BEGIN TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN GHANA'S POLITICAL LIFE. SINCE THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, GHANA HAS CONTINUED ITS ALBEIT SLOW PROGRESS ON DEMOCRATIZATION: THE JUDICIARY IS MORE INDEPENDENT; THERE IS A LARGELY INDEPENDENT PRESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ARE ACTIVE. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE IS THUS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. (ROBERTS)

--TOGO

72. THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY ABORTED IN TOGO, THANKS TO BOTH PRESIDENT EYADEMA'S DETERMINATION TO CLING TO POWER AND THE OPPOSITION'S POLITICAL ERRORS. EYADEMA EMERGED VICTORIOUS FROM THE AUGUST 25 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, GARNERING 96 PERCENT OF THE BALLOTS CAST. TURNOUT WAS A LOW 36 PERCENT. AND MUCH LOWER IN THE ANTI-EYADEMA SOUTH. THE OPPOSITION WAS OUTMANEUVERED BY EYADEMA. THE REFORMERS ALL ALONG FOCUSED THEIR WORRY ON THE DANGER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD USE FORCE AND INTIMIDATION TO WIN THE ELECTION. EYADEMA ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONITORS AND CONFINED THE ARMY TO ITS BARRACKS. HOWEVER, IT IS LIKELY HE ENCOURAGED THE SUPREME COURT TO INVOKE A TECHNICALITY OF THE ELECTORAL CODE TO BAR THE CANDIDACY OF GILCHRIST OLYMPIA, HIS MOST BITTER FOE AND A POTENTIALLY STRONG ELECTORAL OPPONENT. HE ALSO MANIPULATED VOTER LISTS AND ACCUMULATED PHONY VOTER CARDS FOR USE IN THE ELECTION. THESE MANEUVERS CONVINCED THE OPPOSITION THAT HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY OUTCOME EXCEPT A FIRST-BALLOT VICTORY. TO AVOID

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LEGITIMIZING A RIGGED ELECTION, THE OFFOSITION

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CANDIDATES BOYCOTTED THE ELECTION, ABANDONING THE FIELD TO EYADEMA AND TWO MINOR CANDIDATES. THE TOGOLESE PEOPLE ARE WEARY OF THE PROTRACTED STRUGGLE BETWEEN EYADEMA AND THE REFORMERS AND MAY BE RESIGNED TO HIS CONTINUED RULE. (ROBERTS)

--NIGERIA

73. INTERIM HEAD OF STATE SHONEKAN HAS DONE LITTLE TO IMPRESS NIGERIA'S POLITICAL CLASS. OR THE NIGERIAN PEOPLE, DURING HIS FIRST MONTH IN OFFICE. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ABACHA, HAVING REMOVED SOME PRO-BABANGIDA GENERALS AND PRO-DEMOCRACY REFORMERS FROM POSITIONS OF POWER, NOW SEEMS TO CONTROL THE ARMY AND WIELDS TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE OVER THE GOVERNMENT. SHONEKAN APPEARS TO BE A PUPPET WITH THE ARMY CONTINUING TO PULL THE STRINGS AND HAS DEMONSTRATED LITTLE POLITICAL SKILL OR INITIATIVE. DESPITE HIS YORUBA BACKGROUND, HE APPARENTLY HAS MADE NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH THE YORUBA ANGERED BY THE ANNULMENT OF THE JUNE 12 ELECTION. NOR HAS SHONEKAN RID HIS CABINET OF THE CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT HOLDOVERS FROM THE BABANGIDA REGIME. SHONEKAN CLAIMS HE IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE BABANGIDA REGIME AND THAT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT CONSTITUTES ANOTHER STEP TOWARD DEMOCRACY. HE PROMISES PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ON FEBRUARY 19--TOO SOON TO CALM POLITICAL TEMPERATURES, REORGANIZE THE PARTIES. SELECT CANDIDATES, AND CONDUCT A CAMPAIGN--AND INSTALLATION OF AN ELECTED PRESIDENT ON MARCH 31. 1994.

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74. SHONEKAN IS SAYING WHAT HE IMAGINES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WISHES TO HEAR. HIS AIM IS TO GAIN WESTERN FINANCIAL AID AND SECURE PARTIAL FORGIVENESS OF NIGERIA'S CRUSHING FOREIGN DEBT.

75. ABIOLA'S SEPTEMBER 24 RETURN TO NIGERIA, AFTER A SEVEN-WEEK ABSENCE, HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DESTABILIZE NIGERIA FURTHER. ABIOLA HAS BEEN LOW-KEY AND CONCILIATORY TOWARD SHONEKAN IN HIS PUBLIC REMARKS SINCE HIS RETURN, SUGGESTING HE IS ENGAGED IN A PRIVATE DIALOGUE WITH ABACHA AND SHONEKAN. ABIOLA COULD NOT HAVE RETURNED WITHOUT ABACHA'S APPROVAL, AND PRESUMABLY AGREED TO ABIDE BY WHATEVER GROUND RULES ABACHA LAID DOWN. ABIOLA HAS ACTUALLY GOTTEN LESS WHOLEHEARTED

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SUPPORT FROM HIS OWN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) THAN FROM THE ANTI-MILITARY CAMPAIGN FOR DEMOCRACY AND TWO MILITANT UNIONS. A SIZABLE ELEMENT OF THE PARTY SUPPORTS HIS ARCHRIVAL, GENERAL YAR'ADUA, WHO PREFERS NEW ELECTIONS IN WHICH HE COULD RUN. SOME PARTY OFFICIALS ARE FOR SALE TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER. WHILE OTHERS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ABIOLA; MOST WILL EMBRACE OPPORTUNISM, NOT PRINCIPLE.

76. ABIOLA WILL HAVE TO PERFORM A DIFFICULT BALANCING ACT, GIVING SOME SUPPORT TO THE PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT WHILE KEEPING OPEN HIS LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO ABACHA AND SHONEKAN. ONE END RESULT COULD BE A NOMINAL ABIOLA PRESIDENCY, WITH ABACHA REMAINING THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE. THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED ELECTION IRREGULARITIES BY A GOVERNMENT COMMISSION COULD DISCREDIT ABIOLA, FACILITATING THE CONTINUATION. FOR A

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CONSIDERABLE PERIOD, OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH ABACHA WIELDS IMMENSE BEHIND-THE-SCENES POWER WHILE SHONEKAN REMAINS TITULAR HEAD OF GOVERNMENT. (ROBERTS) CHRISTOPHER

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